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1 Introduction
Stalnaker’s Thesis about indicative conditionals is, roughly, that the probability
one ought to assign to an indicative conditional equals the probability that one
ought to assign to its consequent conditional on its antecedent. The thesis seems
right. If you draw a card from a standard 52-card deck, how confident are you
that the card is a diamond if it’s a red card? To answer this, you calculate the
proportion of red cards that are diamonds—that is, you calculate the probability
of drawing a diamond conditional on drawing a red card.
Skyrms’ Thesis about counterfactual conditionals is, roughly, that the prob-
ability that one ought to assign to a counterfactual equals one’s rational expec-
tation of the chance, at a relevant past time, of its consequent conditional on its
antecedent.1 This thesis also seems right. If you decide not to enter a 100-ticket
lottery, how confident are you that you would have won had you bought a ticket?
To answer this, you calculate the prior chance—that is, the chance just before
your decision not to buy a ticket—of winning conditional on entering the lottery.
The central project of this article is to develop a new uniform theory of con-
ditionals that allows us to derive a version of Skyrms’ Thesis from a version of
Stalnaker’s Thesis, together with a chance-deference norm relating rational cre-
dence to beliefs about objective chance.2
I say a version of Stalnaker’s Thesis because it is well known that Stalnaker’s
Thesis itself is subject to a series triviality results. Assuming orthodox probabil-
ity theory, it can be shown that, except in trivial cases, there is noway to interpret
1The label ‘counterfactual conditional’ is misleading. Consider:
(1) If I caught the four o’clock train today, I would make it to the meeting by five.
An utterance of (1) suggests that the speaker leaves open the possibility that she will catch the
four o’clock train. Thus, ‘counterfactual conditional’ hardly seems an apt label if it is to cover
conditionals like (1). Some authors use the term ‘subjunctive conditional’. But this label is also
misleading. It suggests that themain grammatical difference between indicative conditionals and
conditionals like (1) has to do with subjunctive mood. But that is not the case. In most languages,
the primary grammatical difference between indicatives and conditionals like (1) is that the latter
exhibit an extra layer of past tense morphology. I will continue to use the term ‘counterfactual
conditional’ to refer to conditionals, like (1), that contain this extra layer of past tensemorphology
because the term is familiar and I know of no better label.
2For discussion of Skyrms’ Thesis, see Skyrms (1980), Edgington (2008), Williams (2012),
Moss (2013), Schwarz (2016), Schulz (2017), and Khoo (ms).
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the indicative conditional uniformly so that Stalnaker’s Thesis holds universally,
that is, for all rational probability functions. And I say a version of Skyrms’ The-
sis because, as I will show in §3 of this paper, that thesis also has unacceptable
trivializing consequences given orthodox probability theory.
The paper opens in §2 with a discussion of Stalnaker’s Thesis and, following
van Fraassen (1976) and Bacon (2015), suggests an improved, context-sensitive
version of the thesis, which I will call the Local Thesis. The rest of the paper
breaks into two main parts. The first part (§3-§5) refutes Skyrms’ Thesis and
develops a context-sensitive replacement, the Local Conditional Principal Prin-
ciple—a counterfactual analogue of David Lewis’s Principal Principle.
The second part (§6-§8) begins by introducing a neo-Stalnakerian, uniform
theory of conditionals. At a high level, my view says that all of the semantic differ-
ences between indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals boil down
to differences in what is held fixed. When we evaluate an indicative conditional,
we hold fixed all of our knowledge; when we evaluate a counterfactual, we hold
fixed a contextually-determined subset of our knowledge. I show that this the-
ory allows us to derive the Local Conditional Principal Principle from the Local
Thesis and Lewis’s Principal Principle. And although a full tenability result for
the Local Conditional Principal Principle is beyond the scope of this paper, I will
argue in the final section that there is good reason to be optimistic that the prin-
ciple is indeed tenable within the Stalnakerian framework that I develop.
2 From Stalnaker’s Thesis to The Local Thesis
Our eventual goal to derive a plausible, contextualist-friendly version of Skyrms’
Thesis from a plausible, contextualist-friendly version of Stalnaker’s Thesis and
a plausible chance-deference norm. Here I introduce the contextualist-friendly
version of Stalnaker’s Thesis—the Local Thesis.
Suppose I’m a detective working on a murder case. I know that it was either
the butler or the gardener. My credence that it was the gardener, on the suppo-
sition that it wasn’t the butler, is high. Correspondingly, I will be confident in
(2).
(2) If the butler didn’t do it, it was the gardener.
Take another case. Suppose I know that the four o’clock train arrives within an
hour about 75% of the time. So I am 75% confident that John will make it by
five, supposing he catches the four o’clock train. Correspondingly, I will be 75%
confident in (3).
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(3) If John catches the four o’clock train, John will be here by five.
Examples like these are easy to multiply, and the pattern of probability assign-
ments is robust, leading many theorists to endorse some version of Stalnaker’s
Thesis. Where A > B stands for the indicative conditional with antecedent A and
consequent B, Stalnaker’s Thesis is as follows:
Stalnaker’s Thesis
For any rational credence function P such that P(A) > 0: P(A > B) =
P(B|A).3
Stalnaker’s Thesis, as I will understand it here, is a normative thesis. It says that,
if you’re rational, then your credence in A > B is equal to your credence in B
conditional on A (whenever the conditional probability is defined). For instance,
in themurder case, Stalnaker’s Thesis says that, if I’m rational, thenmy credence
(2), if the butler didn’t do it, it was the gardener, equalsmy conditional credence
that the gardener committed the murder given that it wasn’t the butler. I take
no stand on whether there are irrational subjects whose credences in indicative
conditionals diverge from their conditional credences.
Despite its initial plausibility, Stalnaker’s Thesis is false. David Lewis (1976)
showed that Stalnaker’s Thesis has trivializing consequences given just two stan-
dard assumptions: (1) that rational credence functions obey the laws of probabil-
ity; and (2) that the set of rational credence functions is closed under conditional-
ization, so that if P is rational and P(A) > 0, then the probability function P(·|A)
that results from conditioning P on A is also rational. Given (1) and (2), Stal-
naker’s Thesis entails that whenever you think that A and B are compatible, and
that A and ¬B are compatible, you are certain of B conditional on the indicative
conditional A > B. This consequence is unacceptable. To illustrate, suppose that
it’s compatible with my beliefs that Milo is at a picnic and in a good mood, and
compatible with my beliefs that he’s at a picnic and in a bad mood. Stalnaker’s
Thesis predicts that I should be certain that Milo is in a good mood, conditional
on if Milo is at a picnic, he’s in a good mood. In other words, if I learn the con-
ditional if Milo is at a picnic, he’s in a good mood, then I should be certain that
he’s in a good mood. But that’s absurd! For all I know, he’s not at a picnic; for all
I know, he’s not in a good mood. So if we keep (1) and (2), we have no choice but
to reject Stalnaker’s Thesis.
Fortunately there are limited versions of Stalnaker’s Thesis that capture its
intuitivemotivation but are not subject to the Lewisian triviality results. The one
that I will be concerned with—the Local Thesis—is motivated by a contextualist
3I assume the Ratio Formula: If P(A) > 0, then P(B|A) = P(A ∧ B)/P(A).
3
theory of indicative conditionals. Before I state the thesis, let me say a few words
to motivate contextualism independent of its connection to Stalnaker’s Thesis
and avoiding triviality. Contextualism about indicative conditionals is the view
that what proposition is expressed by an utterance of an indicative conditional
depends, in part, on a contextually-supplied body of information. Often that in-
formation is simply the speaker’s knowledge. Other times it is some other body
of information. For example, it may be the knowledge of some other individual
or group. And sometimes the standards are more demanding than knowledge—
such as being known with certainty. Other times they are less demanding. To
allow for this variability, I refer to this contextually-supplied body of informa-
tion simply as the information associated with the context.
Why accept contextualism? One argument comes from so-called stand-off
cases. Consider:
Sly Pete andMr. Stone are playing poker on aMississippi riverboat. It
is nowup to Pete to call or fold.MyhenchmanZach sees Stone’s hand,
which is quite good, and signals its content to Pete. My henchman
Jack sees both hands and sees that Pete’s hand is rather low, so that
Stone’s is the winning hand. At this point, the room is cleared. A few
minutes later, Zack slipsme a notewhich says, ‘If Pete called, hewon,’
and Jack slipsme anotewhich says ‘If Pete called, he lost.’ I know that
both notes come from my trusted henchmen but do not know which
of them sent which note. I conclude Pete folded. (Gibbard 1981, p.
231)
According to the contextualist, Zack says something true when he writes:
(4) If Pete called, he won.
Likewise, Jack says something true when he writes:
(5) If Pete called, he lost.
Zach’s conditional is true relative to Zack’s information. Jack’s conditional is
true relative to Jack’s information. Nevertheless, there is no information state—
that is, no context—relative to which both conditionals are true.
Ifwe’re contextualists, Stalnaker’s Thesis needs to be refinedbecause it doesn’t
mention context. And, as we will see, these refinements are also sufficient for
avoiding the triviality results. Specifically, we need to do two things. First, we
need to add contextual parameters. Both the indicative conditional and the prob-
ability function need to be indexed to a context. Second, we must coordinate
these two contextual parameters—the indicative conditional proposition on the
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left side of the equation must be indexed to the same context as the probabil-
ity function on the right side. The notation is as follows. I write A >c B for the
proposition expressed by the indicative conditional in a given context c. I write
Pc for the probability function associated with c. (To simplify, I assume that Pc
is result of conditioning a uniquely rational initial credence function Po on the
information associated with context c.) The Local Thesis is as follows:
The Local Thesis
Pc(A >c B) = Pc(B|A) whenever Pc(A) > 0.
Suppose, for a moment, that the information associated with a given context c
is the speaker’s knowledge. Then the Local Thesis says that the probability that
the speaker in c assigns to the proposition expressed by the indicative, relative
her information—her indicative conditional, as I will sometimes say—is equal to
the probability that she assigns toB conditional onA. But importantly, it is silent
about the probability that she assigns to propositions expressed by the indicative
conditional in contexts other than her own. I won’t get into the details, but as
Bacon (2015) and others have shown, it is for precisely this reason that the Local
Thesis is not subject to Lewisian triviality results. Indeed, it is not subject to any
triviality results. Building on the work of van Fraassen (1976), Bacon (2015) has
shown that the Local Thesis—or, more carefully, a thesis that is very close to the
Local Thesis—is tenablewithin a possible-worlds semantics for indicatives based
on Stalnaker’s selection semantics. I return to these tenability results in §8.4,5
In the next few sections—sections §3-§5—I will set the Local Thesis to one
side as I work up to my preferred formulation of Skyrms’ Thesis—the Local Con-
ditional Principal Principle. As we will see, that principle is similar in spirit to
4Note that van Fraassen himself is not explicit about how contextualism figures in his ten-
ability results (though he does mention contextualism as a way of escaping Lewisian triviality).
Nevertheless, it is natural to interpret his results within a contextualist framework. See §8 for
more discussion. See also Stefan Kaufman (2005, 2005, 2009) for important work in this tradi-
tion, and Justin Khoo (ms) for a tenability result that is similar to van Fraassen’s but does not
rely on contextualism.
5There are important differences between my statement of the Local Thesis and Bacon’s
contextualist-friendly version of Stalnaker’s Thesis. Here is Bacon’s version, which he calls CP:
CP. For any rational initial probability function Po, any (contextually-supplied) evidential
accessibility relation E, and anyw: Po(A >E B|E(w)) = Po(B|A ∧ E(w))
ForBacon, the proposition expressed by an indicative conditional is relativized to an accessibility
relation. In the formulation of the Local Thesis in the main text, the proposition expressed by
an indicative conditional is relativized to an evidence proposition—a set of worlds. I agree with
Bacon that there are compelling reasons to use accessibility relations rather than sets of worlds,
but it greatly simplifies things to work with a version of the Local Thesis that uses sets of worlds.
The central arguments of this paper do not turn on the differences between CP and the Local
Thesis.
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the Local Thesis. In this section, I hope to have set the basic groundwork for artic-
ulating a contextualist-friendly connection between chance and counterfactuals.
3 Triviality for Counterfactuals: Skyrms’ Thesis
The last section concerned the relationship between indicative conditionals and
probability. In this section, we turn to my primary concern in this paper—the re-
lationship between counterfactuals and chance. I begin by motivating the most
natural formulation of this connection—Skyrms’ Thesis. Then I present a new ar-
gument showing that Skyrms’ Thesis has unacceptable trivializing consequences.
Suppose that I decide not to flip a fair coin at noon. And suppose I know that
the coin had a 50% chance of landing heads and a 50% chance of landing tails.
How confident should I be in the counterfactual (6)?
(6) If the coin had been flipped at noon, it would have landed heads.
50% seems to be the only reasonable answer.
Now imagine that I don’t know the coin is fair. I divide my credence evenly
between two hypotheses about the chance of heads—that the chance of heads is
30% and that the chance of heads is 60%. How confident should I be in (6) in
this case? A natural answer: (50% × 30%) + (50% × 60%) = 45%. That is, my
credence in (6) should be equal to my expectation of the conditional chance, just
before noon, of the coin landing heads conditional on being flipped.
This datamotivates Skyrms’ Thesis—a general principle that ties rational cre-
dences in counterfactuals to rational expectations of prior chances.6 To state the
thesis, let t be a relevant past time; let Cht(B|A) = x be the proposition that the
chance, at t, of B conditional on A is equal to x; and let A  B stand for the
counterfactual with antecedent A and consequent B. Then Skyrms’ Thesis is as
follows:
Skyrms’ Thesis
For any rational P: P(A B) =∑x x× P(Cht(B|A) = x)
Skyrms assumption that t is always a past time is not quite right.7 This issue
6Note that Skyrms himself formulates the thesis in terms of propensities, rather than ob-
jective chances. Propensities provide one way of thinking about what objective chances are. But
there are other interpretations, such as Lewis’s own account developed in Lewis (1980) andLewis
(1994). To remain neutral about what objective chances are, I replace Skyrms’ formulation in
terms of propensities with one that only mentions objective chances.
7Take, for example:
(1) If I caught the four o’clock train today, I would make it to the meeting by five.
The probability that I assign to (1) is equal to the present chance of making the meeting condi-
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is not especially important for my purposes, and I will often speak as though the
relevant time is in the past.
Like Stalnaker’s Thesis, I take Skyrms’ Thesis to be a normative thesis. As I
will understand the thesis here, it says that if you’re rational, then your credence
in A B is equal to your expectation of the chance, at the relevant time, of B
conditional on A. In the coin case, for example, Skyrms’ Thesis says that, if I’m
rational, then my credence in (6), if the coin had been flipped at noon, then it
would have landed heads, equals my expectation of the conditional chance, just
before noon, of the coin landing heads conditional on being flipped.8
Skyrms’ Thesis, I argue, has unacceptable trivializing consequences. Given
orthodox probability theory, it entails that, if you give positive credence to A
B, and positive credence to ¬(A B), then your credence in the counterfactual
A B is equal to your credence in the following proposition: the conditional
chance, at t, of B given A is equal to one. We can go on to derive other absurd
consequences, but this is bad enough. To illustrate, go back to the coin case. We
said that I am 50% confident in (6), if the coin had been flipped, it would have
landed heads. Skyrms’ Thesis entails that I am 50% confident in the following
proposition: the chance of the coin landing heads conditional on being flipped
equals one. But that’s absurd! We can easily imagine that I am certain that the
coin is fair, which is to say that I am not 50% confident in the proposition that
the coin has a 100% chance of landing heads, conditional on being flipped.
Here is the triviality argument. First observe that Skyrms’ Thesis entails (1)
and (2) below (I omit time references for readability):
(a) For any rational P, if P(A B) = 1, then P(Ch(B|A) = 1) = 1
tional on catching the four o’clock train. In general, whenwe evaluate counterfactual conditionals
whose antecedents concern events that will occur at some future time, we set our credence in the
counterfactual to our expectation of the present chance of the consequent given the antecedent.
8There are known counterexamples to Skyrms’ Thesis involving counterlegals—
counterfactuals whose antecedents concern events that violate the laws of nature. A counterlegal
may have positive probability even though its antecedent has chance zero, in which case the
chance of the consequent conditional on the antecedent is undefined. To deal with cases like this,
one option is to use Popper functions, which would allow conditional chances to be well-defined
even if the conditioned proposition is chance zero. Another option is to treat Skyrms’ Thesis
as a special case of a more general thesis stated in terms of hypothetical probability functions.
On this view, one’s credence in a counterfactual is given by the probability of the consequent
conditional on the antecedent, relative to a hypothetical probability distribution that assigns
positive probability to the antecedent and is suitably related to one’s actual probability distribu-
tion. If this hypothetical probability distribution matches the objective chances whenever the
latter are defined, Skyrms’ Thesis would come out as a special case of this more general norm.
(See Edgington (2008) for discussion.) For the purposes of this paper, I do not need to take a
stand on how to handle counterlegals and other counterfactuals with chance-zero antecedents,
so I set these aside.
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(b) For any rational P, if P(A B) = 0, then P(Ch(B|A) = 1) = 0
If you are certain that A B is true, then you are certain that the prior chance
of B conditional on A is one. If you are certain that the counterfactual is false,
then you are certain that the prior chance of B conditional on A is zero.
Now consider any rational probability function P. As Lewis assumed in his
triviality results for Stalnaker’s Thesis, I assume that the class of rational proba-
bility functions is closed under conditionalization: if P is rational, and P(A) > 0,
then P(·|A) is rational.
Suppose that P(A  B) > 0 and P(¬(A  B)) > 0. Then (a) entails (c),
and (b) entails (d):
(c) P(Ch(B|A) = 1|A B) = 1
(d) P(Ch(B|A) = 1|¬(A B)) = 0
And, by the Law of Total Probability, we know (e):
(e) P(Ch(B|A) = 1) = P(Ch(B|A) = 1|A B) × P(A B) + P(Ch(B|A) =
1|¬(A B))× P(¬(A B))
(c), (d), and (e) together give us:
(f) P(Ch(B|A) = 1) = P(A B)
Skyrms’ Thesis has allowed us to derive (f) from the assumption that P(A 
B) > 0 and P(¬(A B)) > 0. This result is unacceptable; we have no choice
but to reject Skyrms’ Thesis.
4 The Conditional Principal Principle
Skyrms’ Thesis seemed plausible on first glance, but closer inspection revealed
it to be untenable. Where do we go from here? To answer this question, I turn
to the literature on chance-deference norms—norms governing the relationship
between our credences and our beliefs about objective chance. For, viewed ab-
stractly, Skyrms’ Thesis is a kind of chance-deference norm; it tells us to defer to
certain conditional chances when setting our credences in counterfactuals.9 My
9I am not the first to draw an analogy between Skyrms’ Thesis and chance-deference norms.
See Schulz (2017) for extended discussion. Schulz endorses a counterfactual analogue of the Prin-
cipal Principle that is similar to my Conditional Principal Principle. There are important differ-
ences betweenmy principle and the one defended by Schulz, however. One important difference
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starting point is David Lewis’s Principal Principle. After introducing this prin-
ciple, I propose a counterfactual version of it—the Conditional Principal Princi-
ple. (A refined, context-sensitive version of this—the Local Conditional Principal
Principle—will be my final proposal.)
Note that Lewis’s Principal Principle is just one of many non-trivializing for-
mulations of the norm to defer to objective chance. There are others, such as Ned
Hall’s New Principle.10 I will not defend the Principal Principle over its rivals. I
only wish to describe one plausible formulation of the norm to defer to objective
chance, and to construct a counterfactual analogue of that principle. I am confi-
dent that we can formulate counterfactual analogues of other chance norms—a
counterfactual version of Hall’s New Principle, for example—but I leave this for
future research.
Let me begin with some examples to motivate Lewis’s Principal Principle.
Suppose I know that a fair die will be tossed in one hour. I know that it has
a 50% chance of landing on an even number and a 50% chance of landing on
an odd number. I have no other relevant information. To what degree should
I believe that the die will land on an even number? 50% seems to be the only
reasonable answer.
Now suppose I don’t know that the die is fair. I divide my credence evenly be-
tween two hypotheses about the chance of even—that it’s 30% and that it’s 60%.
To what degree should I believe that the die will land even? A natural answer:
(50% × 30%) + (50% × 60%) = 45%. My credence that the die will land even
should be equal to my expectation of the chance of even.
The intuitions that I have articulated about these two cases are predicted
by Lewis’s Principal Principle. I am going to state Lewis’s principle in a some-
what unfamiliar way. The formulation I adopt is stated in terms of conditional
chances—specifically, chances conditioned on the subject’s total evidence. (The
more familiar formulation is not stated in terms of chances conditioned on the
subject’s total evidence.) There are two reasons for this: first, a statement in
terms of conditional chances is more straightforwardly extendable to my final
goal, which is to state a counterfactual version of the Principal Principle. Second,
is that he distinguishes two chance functions: the chance function that figures in the Principal
Principle itself (the physical chances) and the one that figures in the counterfactual analogue
of the Principal Principle (the counterfactual chances). The two chance functions have different
properties. I do not distinguish two chance functions—the chance function that figures in the
Conditional Principal Principle is the very same chance function as the one that figures in the
Principal Principle. (The reason for this is that I intend to derive the Conditional Principal Prin-
ciple from the Principal Principle (and the Local Thesis)). See also Fitelson (ms) for discussion
of analogies between the Principal Principle and Stalnaker’s Thesis.
10See Hall (1994) and Hall (2004).
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the conditional chance formulation doesn’t appeal to what Lewis calls inadmis-
sible evidence, a theoretically fraught notion that does appear in more familiar
formulations of the thesis. (In footnote 12, I prove that my formulation of the
Principal Principle entails the more familiar formulation.)
To begin, I introduce the notion of anur-chance function. Consider anyworld
w. Ifw contains an earliest moment, then the ur-chance function ofw—denoted
chw—is a function that takes a proposition and returns its chance at the earli-
est moment of w. Later chance functions are defined in terms of chw as follows.
Where Ht,w is a complete specification of the history at w up to the moment t,
then chw(·|Ht,w) is a function that takes a proposition and returns its chance, at
t, in w.11 Let Po be any reasonable initial credence function. Let ‘pi’ be a rigid
designator that picks out a particular ur-chance function. Let ‘Ch’ be a definite
description for ‘the initial chance, whatever it is’. Finally, let E be any total body
of evidence that is compatible with the proposition Ch = pi. With this notation,
we state the Principal Principle as follows.
The Principal Principle
Po(A|E ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(A|E)
Suppose that your total evidence is E. And suppose that you learn what the ini-
tial chance function is, which is to say that you learn Ch = pi. Then, the Principal
Principle says, you should adopt the opinions pi would have were it given your
evidence E. To use Ned Hall’s metaphor, this version of the Principal Principle
tells us to treat chance as an analyst expert. We defer to the initial objective
chance function not because it has evidence than we don’t have—it doesn’t have
any evidence at all—but because we think it’s especially good at evaluating evi-
dence. Upon learning what the initial chance function is, we feed it our evidence,
and then defer to its conditional opinions—the opinions it would have, if it knew
everything we know.
Now, you might be wondering: How could this principle be useful for ordi-
nary subjects? It tells us what to do if we learn what the entire initial chance
function is like, but we’re never in that situation. What we do learn are facts
about the chances of specific propositions—the proposition that the chance that
a certain die will land on an even number is 50%, for example. But, as I have
stated it, the Principal Principle doesn’t seem to say anything at all about ordi-
nary cases like these. For reasons that I elaborate in a footnote, this concern fails
to appreciate the strength ofmy formulation of the Principal Principlewhen com-
11We can also use chw(·|Ht,w) to define the ur-chance function at worlds that do not have
earliest moments. This issue is orthogonal to the arguments in this paper so I set it aside.
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bined with the laws of probability and our definition of chance.12 My statement
of the Principal Principle does, despite appearances, deliver the right predictions
in ordinary cases of deference to chance. In the case of the die, for example, it
says: if you’re rational, and you know that the die has a 50% chance of landing
even, and you have no other relevant evidence, then you are 50% confident that
the die will land on an even number.
I suggest that we replace Skyrms’ Thesis with a counterfactual version of the
Principal Principle, which I will call Conditional Principal Principle. Now, my
statement of the Principal Principle tells us to give the chances all of our evidence
and then align our credences with the objective chances conditional on our total
evidence. Clearly, this won’t work in the counterfactual case. Suppose I know
that I did not strike the match at noon. In that case, the chance, at noon, that
the match would light conditional on my striking it and all of my evidence is
undefined. But, we may suppose, my credence in (8) is close to one.
(8) If I had struck the match at noon, it would have lit.
So we can’t give the initial chances all of our evidence, as we did with the Prin-
cipal Principle. But what body of evidence should we use instead? An immediate
answer that won’t work: give the chances all of our evidenceminus our evidence
that the antecedent is false. This won’t work because in any ordinary context in
which I assert (8), I also know that thematch did not light. The prior chance that
the match would light conditional on being struck and this piece of knowledge
12We can show that my formulation of the Principal Principle entails Lewis’s more familiar
formulation. Where E is any proposition that is compatible with and wholly admissible with
respect to Cht(A) = x, Lewis’s formulation says:
(7) Po(A|E ∧ Cht(A) = x) = x
Since the t-chances are given by conditioning the ur-chance function on history up to t, we
know that Cht(A) = x is equivalent to the disjunction: (H1t ∧ Ch = pi1) ∨ (H2t ∧ Ch = pi2) ∨ ... ∨
(Hnt ∧Ch = pin), for allHit and pii such that pii(A|Hit) = x. FollowingMeacham (2010), I will assume
that E is admissible with respect to Cht(A) = x just in case E ∧ Cht(A) = x can be expressed as
the disjunction of a subset of the (Hit ∧ Ch = pii)’s associated with Cht(A) = x.
With this definition of admissibility in hand, we can show that (7) follows frommy formulation
of the Principal Principle:
Po(A|E ∧ Cht(A) = x) = Po(A|(H1t ∧ Ch = pi1) ∨ ... ∨ (Hnt ∧ Ch = pin))
= Po(A|(H1t ∧ Ch = pi1) · Po(H1t ∧ Ch = pi1) + ...+ Po(A|(Hnt ∧ Ch = pin) · Po(Hnt ∧ Ch = pin)
= x · Po(H1t ∧ Ch = pi1) + ...+ x · Po(Hnt ∧ Ch = pin)
= x
The first step follows from our definitions of chance and admissibility. The second line follows
from the first by the Law of Total Probability. The third line follows from the second line by my
formulation of the Principal Principle. (For example, my formulation of the Principal Principle
entails that Po(A|(H1t ∧ Ch = pi1) = pi1(A|H1t), which, by hypothesis, is equal to x.) The last line
follows from the third line because the (Hit∧Ch = pii)’s form a partition and so their probabilities
sum to 1.
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of mine is equal to zero. But again, we may suppose that my credence in (8) is
close to one.
Here is what I suggest. Instead of giving the chances all of our evidence, we
give them the subset of our evidence that we hold fixed when we evaluate the
counterfactual. Letme take amoment to explain just what this subset is because
it will be very important in what follows.
When we evaluate a counterfactual, we imagine a hypothetical scenario in
which the antecedent is true and ask ourselves whether the consequent is also
true in that scenario. To do this, we temporarily release some of our knowledge—
our knowledge of the antecedent’s falsity, among other things. But we don’t re-
lease all of our knowledge, as philosophers have long observed. We hold much
of what we know fixed. Take, for instance, Adams’ famous example:
(9) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
Whenwe evaluate (9), we tend to hold fixed our knowledge of how thingswent be-
fore the assassination—thatOswald acted alone, that hewas not part of a conspir-
acy, and so forth. We clearly do not hold fixed all of our knowledge of how things
went after the assassination—that the papers reported that Kennedy was shot,
that his funeral took place, or that Johnson assumed the presidency in 1963.13
My Conditional Principal Principle says that your credence in the counter-
factual A B, upon learning what the ur-chance function is, should be equal
to the ur-chance of B conditional on A and the evidence you’re holding fixed. To
state the principle, we use the notation that we introduced to state the Principal
13This is not to say that we never hold fixed facts about history at later times. Here is a famous
example due to SidneyMorgenbesser. Just before tossing a fair coin, I offer you a bet at good odds
that it will land heads. You decline the bet. I toss the coin, and it lands heads. You regret your
decision to decline the bet, for you know that if you had accepted the bet, you would have won.
You are rationally confident in the counterfactual:
(10) If I had accepted the bet, I would have won.
This is so even though you know that the chance, at the time of the antecedent, of winning con-
ditional on accepting the bet was only 50%. Thus, when you evaluate (10), you hold fixed your
knowledge of the outcome of the toss, in addition to your knowledge of history before the toss.
Note that if the antecedent of a counterfactual concerns a long interval of time, we do not tend
to hold fixed our knowledge of what took place during that interval. Here is a famous example
due to John Pollock:
(11) If my coat had been stolen last year, it would have been stolen on December 31.
Although I know that it was not stolen on the first day, or the second day, or the third day, and so
on, I do not holdmy knowledge of any of these facts fixedwhen I evaluate (11). This observation of
Pollock’s conflicts withDavid Lewis’s influential treatment of counterfactuals. Lewis says that we
evaluate the counterfactual in themost similar antecedent worlds to actuality, and worlds where
history diverges from that of the actual world at later times are ceteris paribus more similar to
actuality than worlds where history diverges earlier.
12
Principle. We let Po be any reasonable initial credence function. We let Ch = pi
be the proposition that the ur-chance function is identical to pi. And we let E be
any total body of evidence that is compatible with the proposition Ch = pi. We
introduce one new piece of notation: E− will be the set of worlds consistent with
all of the information that is held fixed when evaluating the counterfactual—a
strict superset of E.
The Conditional Principal Principle is as follows.
The Conditional Principal Principle
Po(A B|E ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(B|A ∧ E−)
Suppose you learn that the initial chance function is pi. Then theConditional Prin-
cipal Principle says: if you’re rational, then your credence in the counterfactual
A B equals the credence that pi would have in B given A if pi were given all of
the information you are holding fixed.
Think about it this way. The information that you hold fixed is the informa-
tion that you judge relevant to determining whether B would have been true if
A had been true. In the example of Kennedy’s assassination, for instance, you
hold fixed what you know about the events leading up to Oswald pulling the trig-
ger, as well as your general knowledge about presidential assassinations, among
other things. The initial chance function pi should have this information if it is to
determine how likely it is that someone else shoots Kennedy supposing Oswald
doesn’t. You don’t hold fixed that Oswald shot Kennedy, and that, as a result,
nobody else did. Intuitively, this information is irrelevant to what would have
happened if Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy. So the initial chance function pi has
no use for this information.
The Conditional Principal Principle says that, upon learning that the initial
chance function is pi, give pi all of the information that you hold fixed when eval-
uating (9), if Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have. Then ask
pi: Given this information, how likely do you think it is that someone else shoots
Kennedy supposing Oswald doesn’t? If you’re rational, the answer to this ques-
tion is the credence that you assign to (9).14
14Like my formulation of the Principal Principle, my Conditional Principal Principle doesn’t
look like it’s going to be very useful. It tells us what to do if we learn what the entire initial chance
function is like, but it doesn’t seem to say anything about ordinary cases. But again, this concern
fails to appreciate the strength of my formulation of the Principal Principle when combined with
the laws of probability and our definition of chance. We can show that my statement of the Con-
ditional Principal Principle entails (12), where E is any proposition that is compatible with the
proposition Cht(B|A ∧ E−) = x:
(12) Po(A B|E ∧ Cht(B|A ∧ E−) = x) = x
The derivation of (12) frommy formulation of the Conditional Principal Principle mirrors the
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The Conditional Principal Principle avoids the triviality results that refute
Skyrms’ Thesis. Recall that Skyrms’ Thesis implies (1) and (2) below (I omit time
references for readability):
(a) For any rational P, if P(A B) = 1, then P(Ch(B|A) = 1) = 1
(b) For any rational P, if P(A B) = 0, then P(Ch(B|A) = 1) = 0
Taken together, (a) and (b) imply that, if you give positive credence to A B
and positive credence to ¬(A B), then your credence in A B is equal to
your credence in the proposition Ch(B|A) = 1.
The Conditional Principle escapes the triviality result because it does not en-
tail (a) and (b). Instead, it entails (a′) and (b′), where PE is any rational initial
probability function conditioned on evidence E:
(a′) If PE(A B) = 1, then PE(Ch(B|A ∧ E−) = 1) = 1
(b′) If PE(A B) = 0, then PE(Ch(B|A ∧ E−) = 1) = 0
But if we have (a′) and (b′) in place of (a) and (b), we can block the next step of
the argument. For (a′) and (b′) do not entail (c′) and (d′):
(c′) PE(Ch(B|A ∧ E−) = 1|A B) = 1
(d′) PE(Ch(B|A ∧ E−) = 1|¬(A B)) = 0
Andwithout (c′) and (d′) we cannot complete the argument that we used to refute
Skyrms’ Thesis.
5 The Local Conditional Principal Principle
We’re on the right track. We have a counterfactual version of Lewis’s Princi-
pal Principle that avoids the triviality result presented in §3. Still, the principle
is not quite right as it stands. Counterfactuals, it is widely agreed, are context
sensitive—which proposition is expressed by an utterance of a counterfactual
conditional depends, in part, on the conversational context in which the utter-
ance occurs. But the Conditional Principal Principle does not mention context.
So it needs refinement. And, as we will see, the necessary refinements are also
sufficient for avoiding a recent triviality result for Skyrms’ Thesis due toWilliams
(2012).
The case for contextualism about counterfactuals is strong. Consider Quine’s
famous example:
proof of (7) from my formulation of the Principal Principle in footnote 12.
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(13) If Caesar had been in command in North Korea, he would have used the
atom bomb.
(14) If Caesar had been in command in North Korea, he would have used cat-
apults.
It is easy to imagine a context in which we accept (13). It is also easy to imag-
ine a context in which we accept (14). But we cannot imagine a context in which
both (13) and (14) are acceptable. A natural explanation of these facts appeals
to context-sensitivity. When we’re holding fixed twentieth-century military tech-
nology, an utterance of (13) expresses a proposition that is true and an utter-
ance of (14) expresses a proposition that is false. When holding fixed Caesar’s ac-
tual competence with atomic weapons, the situation is reversed: (14) expresses
a proposition that is true and (13) a proposition that is false.
To layer context-sensitivity on top of the Conditional Principal Principle, we
need to do two things, both of which will be familiar from when we layered
context-sensitivity on top of Stalnaker’s Thesis. First, we need to add contex-
tual parameters. Both the counterfactual conditional and the information that is
held fixed need to be indexed to a context. Second, wemust coordinate these two
contextual parameters, just as we saw with the Local Thesis—the counterfactual
conditional proposition must be indexed to the same context as the information
that is held fixed.
Note that what’s held fixed doesn’t depend purely on context, but also on the
antecedent of the conditional. As we’ve seen, when we evaluate a counterfactual
whose antecedent concerns a particular period of time, we hold fixed a broad
range of facts about history before that time, but not after. Consider an example
from Dorr (2016). Suppose John has had breakfast every day this year. You say:
(15) If John had forgotten to have breakfast on Tuesday, that would have been
the first time this year.
To evaluate (15), I hold fixed history before Tuesday—that John had breakfast
on Monday, that he had breakfast on Sunday, and so forth. But plainly I do not
hold fixed that he had breakfast on Tuesday. Now imagine that you had said (16)
instead of (15):
(16) If John had forgotten to have breakfast on Wednesday, that would have
been the first time this year.
In that case, I would have held fixed that John had breakfast on Tuesday, and I
would have assented to (16).15
15There are other examples of antecedent-relativity. Take, for instance, Morgenbesser’s coun-
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I will write E−c (A) to refer to the information that is held fixed in context c
when we are evaluating a counterfactual with antecedent A. I will write Ac B
for the proposition expressed by the counterfactual in context c. I will continue
to assume that Po is the uniquely rational initial credence function. With this
notation, the Local Conditional Principal Principle is as follows.
The Local Conditional Principal Principle
Po(Ac B|Ec ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(B|A ∧ E−c (A))
To illustrate, suppose that you are the speaker of a certain context c. The Local
Conditional Principle says that, if you’re rational, then upon learning that the ur-
chance function is pi, the credence that you assign to your counterfactual—the
proposition expressed by the counterfactual, relative to your context c—is equal
to the chance, relative to pi, of B conditional on A and all of the information held
fixed in c, relative to antecedent A.
Thanks to this contextual coordination, the Local Conditional Principle is not
subject to a recent triviality proof due toWilliams (2012). (Note thatmypresenta-
tion of Williams’ argument differs from his own presentation; Williams’ original
argument targets Skyrms’ Thesis, but I am interested in exploring how a version
of it might be used to refute the Conditional Principal Principle. Although the
details differ, the basic strategies behind the arguments are the same.) Consider
a rational subject in context c who has no evidence, and thus, is not holding any
evidence fixed. The Principal Principle, applied to our subject in c, entails (a)
below (where Ac B is the proposition expressed by the counterfactual in c):
(a) Po(Ac B|Ch = pi) = pi(Ac B)
Since nothing is being held fixed in c, the Local Conditional Principal Principle
entails:
(b) Po(Ac B|Ch = pi) = pi(B|A)
Notice that (a) and (b) together entail (c):
(c) pi(Ac B) = pi(B|A)
terfactual, repeated below:
(10) If I had accepted the bet, I would have won.
When we evaluate (10), we hold fixed the fact that the coin landed heads. But not necessarily
when we evaluate (17):
(17) If I had flipped the coin with a different hand, I would have won the bet.
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Now, as Williams observes, that equation looks a lot like Stalnaker’s Thesis. The
indicative conditional has been replaced with a counterfactual and the rational
credence function with an objective chance function. But the Lewisian triviality
results that refute Stalnaker’s Thesis do not presuppose any particular interpre-
tation of the conditional operator, nor do they depend on any particular interpre-
tation of probability. Perhaps, then, we can use a version of Lewis’s argument to
refute the Conditional Principal Principle.
There are two critical lemmas in Lewis’s argument, stated in terms of chance
and counterfactuals below:
Lemma 1. pi(Ac B|B) = 1
Lemma 2. pi(Ac B|¬B) = 0
If we can derive these two lemmas from the Local Conditional Principal Prin-
ciple and the Principal Principle, then we can use Lewis’s reasoning to derive
the absurd conclusion that, if pi(B) > 0 and pi(¬B) > 0, then pi(B|A) = pi(B).
That is, if the initial chance function pi assigns positive probability to B, and pos-
itive probability to ¬B, then B is probabilistically independent of A, relative to
pi.16 Fortunately, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 don’t follow from the Local Conditional
Principal and the Principal Principle. To see why not, consider how we might
try to derive Lemma 1, following the argument in (a) to (c) above. The first step
would be to obtain (a′) from the Principal Principle:
(a′) Po(Ac B|Ch = pi ∧ B) = pi(Ac B|B)
The second step would be to obtain (b′) from the Local Conditional Principle (in
a moment we’ll see that this is the step that’s blocked):
(b′) Po(Ac B|Ch = pi ∧ B) = pi(B|A ∧ B) = 1
The third step would be to derive Lemma 1 from (a′) and (b′).
The problem with this argument is that the Local Conditional Principal Prin-
ciple does not entail (b′). The Local Conditional Principle requires the counter-
factual proposition Ac B to be coordinated with the information that is held
16Remember that (c) says that pi(Ac B) = pi(B|A). So if we can show that pi(Ac B) =
pi(B), we can conclude that pi(B|A) = pi(B). Here is the proof of pi(Ac B) = pi(B) from Lemma
1 and Lemma 2.
pi(Ac B) = pi(Ac B|B)× pi(B) + pi(Ac B|¬B)× pi(¬B)
= 1× pi(B) + 0× pi(¬B)
= pi(B)
The step from the first line to the second uses the Law of Total Probability. The step from the
second to the third uses Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
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fixed in context c, relative to antecedent A. Thus, it requires the probability of
Ac B, conditional on Ch = pi, to be equal to pi(B|A ∧ B) only if B is held fixed
in context c. But, by hypothesis, B is not held fixed in c—nothing is held fixed in
c.
My contextualist defense of the Local Conditional Principal Principlemirrors
the contextualist defense of the Local Thesis. The Local Thesis escapes Lewisian
triviality by requiring the indicative conditional to be indexed to the same con-
text as the subject’s evidence. The Local Conditional Principle escapes Williams’
triviality argument by requiring the counterfactual conditional to be indexed to
the same context as the evidence that the subject is holding fixed. Both principles
should be seen as part of a unified, contextualist approach to the probabilities of
conditionals.
6 A Sketch of a Theory of Conditionals
Mygoalwhen I started this paperwas to derive a plausible, contextualist-friendly
version of Skyrms’ Thesis from a plausible, contextualist-friendly version of Stal-
naker’s Thesis and a plausible chance-deference norm. We now have the first
three ingredients. Our chance-deference norm is the Principal Principle. Our
contextualist-friendly version of Stalnaker’s Thesis is the Local Thesis. And our
contextualist-friendly version of Skyrms’ Thesis is the Local Conditional Princi-
pal Principle. Here I turn to the final ingredient—the theory of conditionals.
I develop a theory onwhich all of the semantic differences between indicative
conditionals and counterfactuals boil down to differences in what is held fixed in
the context in which we evaluate the conditional. Following Stalnaker and oth-
ers, I say that when we evaluate indicative conditionals, we hold fixed all of our
knowledge.17 And, as we’ve seen in previous sections, when we evaluate counter-
factuals, we hold fixed a contextually-determined subset of our knowledge. Be-
17More carefully, when we evaluate indicative conditionals, we hold fixed all of the informa-
tion that is associated with our context. As I mentioned earlier, this will often be the speaker’s
knowledge, but sometimes it will be the knowledge of some other group or individual. Moreover,
sometimes we may require something more demanding than knowledge, such as being known
with certainty. This sort of flexibility is needed to account for cases like Adams’s famous example:
(18) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, some else did.
Plausibly, I know that Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy. Nevertheless, I am not holding this knowl-
edge fixed when I evaluate the indicative conditional. Perhaps that’s because we are only hold-
ing fixed what I know with certainty, and in any context in which I utter (18), I don’t count as
knowing that Oswald shot Kennedy with certainty. Or perhaps I do know this proposition with
certainty but I am not presupposing that it is true (in the sense outlined in Stalnaker (2002)) for
the purposes of the conversation. See Holguín (forthcoming) for extended discussion of cases
like this.
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cause indicative conditionals and counterfactual conditionals, onmy view, differ
only in what is held fixed, there is a systematic connection between the truth con-
ditions for indicatives and the truth conditions for counterfactuals. Roughly, a
counterfactual is true, relative to our present context, just in case the correspond-
ing indicative conditional is true relative to the information we are holding fixed.
In this section, I showhow to implement this ideawithin a Stalnakerian selection
semantics framework for conditionals.18
Stalnaker’s theory is a uniform theory of conditionals. He states the truth
conditions for conditionals in terms of a contextually-supplied selection function
f. This is a function that takes a worldw, and an antecedentA, and yields a world
where A is true—the selected A-world, relative tow. Then Stalnaker says that, a
conditional, whether indicative or subjunctive, is true at a world w just in case
the selected antecedent-world, atw, is a consequent world.
To adopt a uniform theory of conditionals is not, of course, to say that in-
dicatives and counterfactuals have the same meaning. They do not. Indicative
conditionals are about epistemic possibilities; counterfactuals usually concern
possibilities that are incompatible with our knowledge. Adams’s famous mini-
mal pair highlights the contrast:
(9) If Oswald didn’t shoot Kennedy, someone else did.
(19) If Oswald hadn’t shot Kennedy, someone else would have.
While (19) strikes us as a dubious claim about an alternative course of history,
(9) looks straightforwardly true. The difference seems to that while (9) is about
how the world must have been, given what we now know, if Oswald wasn’t the
shooter, (9) is about how theworldwould have been had history taken a different
course.
How do we account for these differences within a uniform theory? Stalnaker
proposes that the selection function we use to evaluate indicative conditionals is
subject to a special constraint: roughly, the selected antecedent-world must be
an epistemically possible world. Here is a precise statement of the constraint on
indicative selection functions.
Stalnaker’s Constraint
If A ∩ Ec ̸= ∅, then ifw ∈ Ec, fc(w,A) ∈ Ec.
This says: If A is compatible with the information associated with context c, then
for any world w in Ec, the selected A-world, at w, is also in Ec. Stalnaker’s con-
18I choose Stalnaker’s framework because, as van Fraassen (1976) and others have argued,
Stalnaker’s distinctive logic for conditionals—specifically, the principle of Conditional Excluded
Middle—is needed if we want to vindicate the Local Thesis.
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straint captures the sense in which, when assessing indicatives, we hold fixed all
of our knowledge. To evaluate an indicative, we check whether the consequent
is true at an epistemically possible antecedent world—that is to say, at a world
where everything we know is true. Counterfactuals, Stalnaker says, are not sub-
ject to this constraint; their selection functions may reach outside the set of epis-
temically possible worlds.
I am going to account for the differences between indicatives and counterfac-
tuals in a different way. It is clear that we cannot uphold Stalnaker’s Constraint,
in its current form, for counterfactuals. One response is to dispense with the
constraint altogether, as Stalnaker seems to suggest. But another response is to
replace it with something else. On an abstract level, it is not hard to see what the
replacement should be. For indicatives, Stalnaker’s Constraint requires that the
selected antecedent-world be one where everything we’re holding fixed when we
evaluate the indicative is true—a world where everything we know is true. For
counterfactuals, the selected antecedent-world should be one where everything
we’re holding fixed when we evaluate the counterfactual is true—a world where
some of what we know is true, the part we’re holding fixed.
To implement this idea, I propose that a conditional, whether indicative or
subjunctive, is evaluated relative to a conditional information function. This is a
function s that takes an information stateE and delivers a selection function that
is Stalnakerian relative to E—a selection function that satisfies the constraints
that Stalnaker imposes on indicative selection functions, relative to information
state E. The constraint that matters for my purposes is a generalized version of
Stalnaker’s Constraint,Generalized Stalnaker’s Constraint (I leave the others to
a footnote):19
19The other four constraints are:
Success. s(E)(w,A) ∈ A if A ̸= ∅.
Minimality. s(E)(w,A) = w ifw ∈ A
Absurd. Where γ is an absurd world that makes all sentences true, s(E)(w,A) = γ if and
only if A = ∅
CSO. If s(E)(w,A) ∈ B and s(E)(w,B) ∈ A, then s(E)(w,A) = s(E)(w,B).
Success is needed to secure the validity of Identity, the principle that if A, then A is always true;
See Mandelkern (2020) for extended discussion. Minimality secures the validity of Modes Po-
nens. Absurd secures a form of Conditional Non-Contradiction. CSO is needed to validate a host
of intuitively compelling inference patterns. Note, however, that there is a tension between CSO
and the Local Thesis. We can use an argument due to Stalnaker (1976) to show that the Local
Thesis trivializes if we assume CSO. But importantly, Stalnaker’s proof relies on instances of the
Local Thesis that involve conditionals with conditional antecedents. There are two possible re-
sponses to this argument. One is to dispensewithCSO; this strategy is advocated byBacon (2015).
A different response is to reject the fully general version of the Local Thesis and replace it with
a version that is restricted to conditionals with non-conditional antecedents. Importantly, if we
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Generalized Stalnaker’s Constraint
If E ∩ A ̸= ∅, then for allw ∈ E, s(E)(w,A) ∈ E.
The only difference between indicative and subjunctive conditionals, on my
view, is that they supply different arguments to the conditional information func-
tion. For an indicative conditional, the argument to the conditional information
function is Ec, the set of worlds compatible with everything we know. This gives
us the following semantic entry, which is roughly equivalent to Stalnaker’s own
theory of indicative conditionals:
Indicative Selection SemanticsJA > BKc,w,s = 1 iff s(Ec)(w,A) ∈ B
This says: An indicative conditional is true at a world w, relative to a context c
and conditional information function s, just in case s takes Ec—the information
associated with c—to a selection function that takes w and the antecedent A to
a world where the consequent B is true. The selection function is Stalnakerian
relative to Ec so it satisfies the Generalized Stalnaker’s Constraint relative to Ec.
This means that we evaluate an indicative conditional by checking whether the
consequent holds at an antecedent world that is compatible with everything we
know.
For counterfactuals, the informational argument to the conditional informa-
tion function is the set of worlds consistent with what we are holding fixed, rel-
ative to the antecedent of the counterfactual.20 (Remember that what we hold
fixed for counterfactuals varies by antecedent.) The semantic entry is as follows:
Counterfactual Selection SemanticsJA BKc,w,s = 1 iff s(E−c (A))(w,A) ∈ B
This says: A counterfactual is true at a world w, relative to a context c and con-
ditional information function s, just in case s takes E−c (A)—the information that
we hold fixed, relative to antecedent A—to a selection function that takes w and
the antecedent A to a world where the consequent B is true. The selection func-
tion is Stalnakerian relative to E−c (A) so it satisfies the Generalized Stalnaker’s
Constraint relative to E−c (A). This means that we evaluate a counterfactual con-
accept only the restricted version of the Local Thesis, then we can only derive a restricted version
of the Local Conditional Principle. If, instead, we reject CSO and accept the Local Thesis in full
generality, then we can derive the Local Conditional Principle in full generality. I am inclined
towards the second strategy, but I do not have the space to offer a full defense of that choice here.
Note that the remarks that I make in §8 about tenability apply only to the restricted version of
the Local Thesis.
20I am indebted to David Boylan for extensive discussion about the formal relationship be-
tween Ec and E−c in a Stalnakerian selection semantics. An important question is how to derive
these meanings compositionally. See the conclusion for a brief discussion.
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ditional by checking whether the consequent holds at an antecedent world that
is compatible with everything we’re holding fixed.
Onmy theory, both indicatives and counterfactuals are governed by General-
ized Stalnaker’s Constraint, and there are no other differences between the selec-
tion functions that we use to interpret the two kinds of conditional. As a result,
there is a close connection between the truth conditions for indicatives and the
truth conditions for counterfactuals. To make this connection precise, let me in-
troduce some notation. Consider a context c.E−c (A) is, to repeat, the set of worlds
compatible with everything we’re holding fixed in c, relative to antecedent A. Let
c− be a hypothetical context in which our information is characterized by E−c (A).
In other words, E−c (A) = Ec− . My theory predicts:21
JA BKc,s = JA > BKc−,s
This says: The proposition expressed by the counterfactual A  B relative to
〈c, s〉 is identical to the proposition expressed by the indicative A > B relative
to 〈c−, s〉. In the next section, we will see that this fact plays a crucial role in
deriving the Local Conditional Principal Principle from the Principal Principle
and the Local Thesis.
We have my neo-Stalnakerian uniform theory conditionals in place. I will
close this section by giving three brief arguments formy uniform theory of condi-
tionals, on which both indicatives and counterfactuals are subject to Generalized
Stalnaker’s Constraint, and there are no other differences between indicative and
counterfactual selection functions.22
First is an abductive argument based on the main claims of this paper. We
have good reason to believe that some version of Skyrms’ Thesis is true. I argue
that we can derive this principle from the Local Thesis, the Principal Principle,
and the unified semantics that I propose, on which both indicatives and subjunc-
tives are subject toGeneralized Stalnaker’s Constraint. This gives us some reason
to believe that the premises of that derivation are true. Since one of the premises
is my uniform theory of conditionals, we have some reason to believe that this
uniform theory is right.
A second, closely related argument concerns the fact that the probability one
assigns to a counterfactual is often equal to the probability that one assigned to
21Proof. Suppose A B is true relative 〈c,w, s〉. By the Counterfactual Selection Semantics,
it follows that s(E−c (A))(w,A) ∈ B. Then, by the Indicative Selection Semantics and the definition
of c−, it follows that A > B is true relative to 〈c−,w, s〉.
Now suppose that A > B is true relative to 〈c−,w, s〉. By the Indicative Selection Semantics
and the definition of c−, it follows that that s(E−c (A))(w,A) ∈ B. Then, by the Counterfactual
Selection Semantics, it follows that A B is true relative 〈c,w, s〉.
22Thanks to Harvey Lederman and Matt Mandelkern for discussion about these arguments.
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the corresponding indicative conditional at an earlier time. Suppose I know the
Lakers are playing the Clippers in the NBA semi-finals, and that whoever wins
that series will go on to the NBA finals and play the Celtics. Before the series
starts I am confident in the indicative conditional (20).
(20) If the Lakers beat the Clippers, they will win the NBA championship.
The series between the Lakers and the Clippers concludes and the Clippers have
won. I now endorse the counterfactual:
(21) If the Lakers had beat the Clippers, they would have won the NBA cham-
pionship.
The probability I now assign to the counterfactual (21) at the conclusion of the
series matches the probability I assigned to the indicative (20) at the start of
the series. My theory easily accounts for this observation. If we assume that the
information I hold fixed when evaluating (21) is identical to my total evidence at
the earlier time when evaluating (20), then, on my theory, the proposition I am
evaluating now just is the proposition I was evaluating then. And if these are just
the same propositions, then of course I assign them equal probability.
A final argument concernspresupposition. Contemporary research about pre-
supposition starts from the idea that the presuppositions of a clause must be sat-
isfied relative to their local contexts. The local context of an embedded clause is,
very roughly, the information information that is already available—the infor-
mation that we can draw on to evaluate the clause—in the course of processing
the sentence. Schlenker (2009) develops an algorithm for calculating local con-
texts, which says, very roughly, that the local context for an embedded clause is
the strongest proposition that you can add to that clause without changing the
truth-value of the whole sentence at any world in the global context. Mandelkern
and Ramoli (2017) have shown that, given Stalnaker’s semantics for indicatives,
this algorithm rightly predicts that the local context for the antecedent of an in-
dicative conditional is (using my notation) Ec, the set of worlds consistent with
the information associated with the context. Stalnaker’s Constraint plays a crit-
ical role in their argument. For, together with Stalnaker’s other constraints on
selection functions, Stalnaker’s Constraint entails that, for any w ∈ Ec, and any
A compatible with Ec, f(w,A) = f(w,A∩Ec). And once this constraint is in place,
it is not hard to show that adding Ec to the antecedent won’t change the truth-
value of the conditional at worlds compatible with our information.
Now, the local context for the antecedent of a counterfactual clearly isn’t Ec.
Counterfactual antecedents are often inconsistent with what we know. So their
local contexts can’t contain all of our information. But they do seem to contain
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some of our information. Take an example from Heim (1992). You and I both
know that Mary went to the party. I’m wondering whether she attended with her
partner John. You’re pretty sure John didn’t attend, and you say:
(22) If John had attended too, I would have seen him.
An utterance of (22) is predicted to be felicitous only if the presupposition of its
antecedent—that a salient individual attended the party—is satisfied relative to
its local context. Hence, our theory of local contexts had better predict that the
local context of the antecedent of (22) entails that a salient person—in this case,
Mary—attended the party. In light of examples like (22), a natural hypothesis is
that the local context of the antecedent of a counterfactual is the set of worlds
consistent with what we’re holding fixed.23 Generalized Stalnaker’s Constraint
will play a central role in deriving this prediction, just as we saw with indicatives.
For again, togetherwith the other constraints, Stalnaker’s Constraint entails that,
for anyw ∈ E−c (A), and any A compatible with E−c (A), f(w,A) = f(w,A ∩ E−c (A)).
Once this constraint is in place, addingE−c (A) to the antecedent won’t change the
truth-value of the conditional at worlds compatible with our information.
7 Deriving the Local Conditional Principal Principle
Now that I have outlined my theory of conditionals, I am ready to show how we
can use that theory to derive the Local Conditional Principal Principle from the
Local Thesis and the Principal Principle.24
So that we have everything in front of us, here is the Local Conditional Prin-
cipal Principle:
Local Conditional Principal Principle
Po(Ac B|Ec ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(B|A ∧ E−c (A))
Remember that Po is the uniquely rational initial credence function; Ec is the
information associated with context c; and E−c (A) is the information that is held
fixed, relative to antecedent A.
23Heim (1992) makes a similar suggestion. She says: ‘...the antecedent of a counterfactual is
not really added to an empty context, but to one which is in some sense a revision of the common
ground c. It results from c by suspending some of the assumptions in c; i.e., it is a superset of c.’
24See Moss (2013) for a derivation of a version of Skyrms’ Thesis for future-directed subjunc-
tive conditionals from the Principal Principle. Moss does not show how to extend her argument
to the case of past-directed subjunctive conditionals. But, as she notes, this does not mean that
her argument has no implications for past subjunctives. If the proposition expressed by an ear-
lier utterance of a future-directed subjunctive is the very same proposition as the proposition
expressed by a current utterance of a past-directed subjunctive, then constraints on credences in
future-directed subjunctives will entail constraints on credences in past-directed subjunctives.
In many ways, then, the project of this essay is quite friendly to Moss’s framework.
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My derivation of the Local Conditional Principal Principle will rely on three
principles. We have already seen two of these principles—the Local Thesis and
the Principal Principle, repeated below.
Local Thesis
Po(A >c B|Ec) = Po(B|A ∧ Ec)
The Principal Principle
Po(A|E ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(A|E)
The third is a principle we have not yet seen that concerns the relationship be-
tweenEc, our actual information, andE−c (A), the informationwe hold fixedwhen
we evaluate a counterfactual with antecedent A. That principle is:
Independence
Po(Ac B|E−c (A)) = Po(Ac B|Ec)
Independence says that the probability of A c B conditional on E−c (A) (the
evidence we hold fixed in context c) is equal to the probability of Ac B condi-
tional on Ec (our evidence in context c).
To see why this assumption is warranted, remember what E−c (A) is supposed
to represent. The information that youhold fixedwhen you evaluate a counterfac-
tual with antecedent A is the information that you judge relevant to determining
what would have happened if A had been true. The information that you do not
hold fixed is information you do not judge relevant to determining what would
have happened if A had been true. Recall the case of Kennedy’s assassination.
You hold fixed a broad range of facts about what happened before Oswald pulled
the trigger—that Oswald acted alone, that he was not part of a conspiracy, and
so forth. You do not hold fixed what happened after the assassination—that Os-
wald shot Kennedy, that nobody else shot Kennedy, or that Johnson assumed
the presidency in 1963. Consider a rational subject who knows everything you’re
holding fixed, and nothingmore—that is, a rational subject whose total evidence
consists of everything you know about history before Oswald pulled the trigger,
and nothing you know about history after. Independence says that the proba-
bility that this subject assigns to the counterfactual (9), if Oswald hadn’t shot
Kennedy, nobody else would have, equals the probability that you assign to the
counterfactual. In other words, learning what you’re not holding fixed—that is,
learning that Oswald shot Kennedy, that nobody else shot Kennedy, that John-
son assumed the presidency in 1963, and so forth—should not change her view
about the counterfactual (9). For if it did, thenEc (your total evidence)must know
something that E−c (A) (the evidence you’re holding fixed) doesn’t know and that
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you judge relevant to determining what would have happened if Oswald hadn’t
shot Kennedy. But in that case you should have been holding it fixed!25
To make things concrete, I will show how the derivation of the Local Condi-
tional Principal Principle works for a specific example. Suppose that onMonday
at noon you are deciding whether to buy a lottery ticket. For simplicity, I will as-
sume that you know Ch = pi. Suppose that you decide not to purchase the ticket.
Later you are evaluating the counterfactual:
(24) If you had bought the ticket, you would have lost.
Let c be the context in which you are evaluating (24). Ec is your current in-
formation and, where Buy is the proposition that you buy the ticket, E−c (Buy) is
the information you hold fixed when evaluating (24). Let c− be your context at
noon, just before decidingnot to buy the ticket. Iwill assume that the information
associated with c− just is the information that you hold fixed in c—specifically,
everything you knew before deciding not to buy the ticket and nothing you have
learned since.
Our derivation begins with an instance of the Principal Principle (whereWin
is the proposition that you win the lottery).
(a) Po(Win|Buy ∧ E−c (Buy)) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ E−c (Buy))
(a) says that your credence, at noon, that you win the lottery, conditional on buy-
ing the ticket, is equal to the initial chance of winning conditional on buying a
ticket and your total evidence at noon. (This follows from the Principal Principle
because we have stipulated that you know that the initial chance function is pi.)
Next, observe that (b) follows from (a) and the Local Thesis:
(b) Po(Buy >c− Win|E−c (Buy)) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ E−c (Buy))
25Independence places constraints on the relationship between Ec (your evidence) and E−c (A)
(what you hold fixed, relative to antecedent A). It might be helpful to look at a specific case in
which Independence is satisfied. Often when you’re evaluating a counterfactual A  B, the
relationship betweenEc andE−c (A) is the following:Ec = E−c (A)∩(¬A∧¬B). That is, your current
knowledge is the result of intersecting what you hold fixed with the negation of the antecedent
and the negation of the consequent. Take the coin case. I decide not to flip a fair coin. I am
evaluating the counterfactual (6), if the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads. I
hold fixed all of my knowledge except for my knowledge of the fact that I did not flip the coin and
that, as a result, it did not land heads. If this case, Independence says (where E−c (Heads) is the
set of worlds consistent with what I hold fixed):
(23) Po(Headsc Flip|E−c (Heads)) = Po(Headsc Flip|E−c (Heads) ∩ (¬Flip ∧ ¬Heads))
In the next section, I will show that that this instance of Independence holds in van Fraassen’s
Stalnaker-Bernoulli models—the models that van Fraassen (1976) and Bacon (2015) use to es-
tablish the tenability of the Local Thesis.
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Your credence, at noon, in Buy >c− Win—the proposition expressed by the in-
dicative conditional relative to your information at noon—is equal to the initial
chance of winning conditional on buying a ticket and your total evidence at noon.
On page 22, I showed that the counterfactual Buyc Win is the very same
proposition as the indicativeBuy>c− Win. Thismeans that the probability of the
former is always equal to the probability of the latter. Thus, (c) follows from (b):
(c) Po(Buyc Win|E−c (Buy)) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ E−c (Buy))
Your credence, at noon, inBuyc Win—the proposition expressed by the coun-
terfactual relative to your present context, after deciding not to buy the lottery
ticket—is equal to the initial chance of winning conditional on buying and your
total evidence at noon.
Next, we appeal to Independence, which says that the probability of Buyc
Win, conditional on E−c (Buy)—what you hold fixed—is equal to your credence
Buyc Win, conditional on you Ec—your total evidence.26 Applying Indepen-
dence to (c) gives us:
(d) Po(Buyc Win|Ec) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ E−c (Buy))
We said that E−c (Buy)—your evidence at noon—entails Ch = pi. Since Ec en-
tails E−c (Buy), it follows that Ec also entails Ch = pi. Thus, (d) entails (e):
(e) Po(Buyc Win|Ec ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(B|A ∧ E−c (Buy))
And (e) is an instance of the Local Conditional Principal Principle.
We have shown that under the assumption that you know Ch = pi, the Local
Conditional Principal Principle follows from the Principal Principle, the Local
Thesis, and Independence.27
26Oneway to secure Independence in this example is be to assume that:Ec = E−c (Buy)∩¬Buy.
(See §8 for explanation.) This assumption seems plausible given the setup of the case.
27Here’s how it goes when E−c (Buy) doesn’t ‘know’ the chance ofWin conditional on Buy. Let
cch be the context that results fromupdating the information in c,Ec, with the propositionCh = pi.
I will assume that what’s held fixed in this new context is the intersection of what’s held fixed in
c and Ch = pi. So we want to show that:
Po(Buycch Win|Ec ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi))
We begin with an instance of the Principal Principle:
(a) Po(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi)) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ E−c (Buy))
Next, (a) entails (b):
(b) Po(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi)) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi))
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The details of the derivation are somewhat involved, so let me take amoment
to walk through it in a more informal way. Suppose you are evaluating a coun-
terfactual with antecedent A and consequent B. Consider a subject whose total
evidence is the evidence that you hold fixed (and, we will assume, who knows all
of the chance facts). By the Principal Principle, her credence in B given A equals
the conditional chance of B given A, and by the Local Thesis, her credence in B
given A equals her credence in her indicative conditional—that is, the proposi-
tion expressed by the indicative conditional, relative to her information. Thus it
follows that her credence in her indicative is equal to the conditional chance of
B given A.
Now, according to the uniform semantics for conditionals that I have pro-
posed, the proposition expressed by the indicative, relative to her information,
is equivalent to the proposition expressed by the corresponding counterfactual
A B, relative to your context. This means that her credence in her indicative
is equal to her credence in your counterfactual. But remember that she has all
of the information that you have and that you judge relevant to evaluating the
counterfactual. Thus, it stands to reason that your credence in your counterfac-
tual should equal her credence in your counterfactual.
If your credence in your counterfactual is equal to her credence in your coun-
terfactual, which, in turn, is equal to her credence in her indicative, then your
credence in your counterfactual is equal to her credence in her indicative. And
we have already seen that her credence in her indicative is equal to the condi-
tional chance of B given A. So, putting everything together, it follows that your
credence in your counterfactual is equal to the conditional chance of B given A,
just as the Local Conditional Principal Principle requires.
(The reason that (a) entails (b) is that it is a consequence of the Principal Principle that the initial
chance function knows that it is the initial chance function: pi(Ch = pi) = 1.)
Let c− be any context such that the information associated with c− is the information that is
held fixed in cch. Then (b) and the Local Thesis entail:
(c) Po(Buy >c− Win|E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi))
By the theory of conditionals outlined in §6, (c) entails (d):
(d) Po(Buycch Win|E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi))
And finally, (d) and Independence entail:
(e) Po(Buycch Win|Ec ∧ Ch = pi) = pi(Win|Buy ∧ (E−c (Buy) ∧ Ch = pi))
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8 Looking Forward: Tenability
Bas van Fraassen (1976) and Andrew Bacon (2015) have shown that the Local
Thesis is tenablewithin a Stalnakerian semantic framework. There are non-trivial
models in which the Local Thesis holds for the Stalnaker conditional. On an ab-
stract level, it is not hard to see how to extend these results to establish the ten-
ability of the Local Conditional Principle. That principle follows from the Prin-
cipal Principle, the Local Thesis, and Independence. So if there are non-trivial
models in which all three of these principles hold, then there are non-trivial
models in which the Local Conditional Principal Principle holds—that is, the
Local Conditional Principal Principle is tenable. (Note: I am only going to talk
about simple conditionals in this section—conditionals with non-conditional an-
tecedents and consequents.)
Here is a simplified overview of van Fraassen’s Stalnaker-Bernoulli mod-
els.28 We evaluate conditional sentences relative to sequences of worlds. The
first world in the sequence represents all of the non-conditional propositions
that are true at the sequence—that is, all of the facts that can be specified without
mentioning conditionals. And the rest of the sequence represents the conditional
facts. To construct a Stalnaker-Bernoulli model, we begin with a set of worlds I,
which I will take to be the set of worlds compatible with all of the non-conditional
information in a given context. We defineOI as the set of all sequences of worlds
in I. For example, if I = {w1,w2,w3}, then:
OI = {〈w1,w2,w3〉, 〈w1,w3,w2〉, 〈w2,w1,w3〉〈w2,w3,w1〉, 〈w3,w1,w2〉, 〈w3,w2,w1〉}
A non-conditional sentence A is true at a sequence just in case the first world in
that sequence is an A-world. A conditional A > B is true at a sequence just in
case the first A-world in the sequence is also a B-world. Suppose, for instance,
that A is true at w1 and w2, but false at w3, and that B is true at w1, but false at
w2 and w3. Then the conditional A > B is true at 〈w1,w2,w3〉, 〈w1,w3,w2〉, and
〈w3,w1,w2〉, and false at the other three sequences.
(Note that we can represent the information that a sequence of worlds car-
ries using more familiar Stalnakerian machinery: specifically, a pair 〈w, f〉 con-
28I am heavily indebted to lecture notes from Justin Khoo and Paolo Santorio for this presen-
tation. See Khoo and Santorio, ‘LectureNotes: Probabilities of Conditionals inModal Semantics.’
The models in the main text make various simplifying assumptions. They assume that all worlds
have the same probability. They also assume that the initial set of worlds I is finite. Finally, they
assume that a conditional is true at a sequence just in case the first A-world in the sequence is
a B-world. If we want to handle conditionals with conditional antecedents, this definition has to
be amended.
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sisting of a world (which specifies the non-conditional facts) and a selection
function (which specifies the conditional facts). Take, for instance, the sequence
S1 = 〈w1,w2,w3〉. This sequence corresponds to the pair 〈w1, f〉 where f is a se-
lection function satisfying two constraints: (i) for any w ∈ I: if w ∈ A, then
f(w,A) = w; and (ii) for any w ∈ I: if w /∈ A, then f(w,A) = the first A-world
in S1. More generally, each sequence in OI corresponds to a pair consisting of a
world in I and a selection function that is Stalnakerian relative to I—that is, a
selection function that satisfies Stalnaker’s constraints relative to I.)
To model the probabilities of conditionals, van Fraassen provides a recipe
for taking us from a probability function P defined over I to a probability func-
tion P′ defined over OI . He shows that the resulting probability function (1) ex-
tends P in the sense that P′(A) = P(A) for all non-conditional A, and (2) for
simple conditionals, the probability of the conditional is the corresponding con-
ditional probability (whenever the conditional probability is defined). Although
van Fraassen himself is not explicit about the role of context-sensitivity, there
is a natural way of interpreting his results within a contextualist framework. If
you feed the construction Ec and Pc—the information associated with c, and the
probability function associated with c, respectively—the constructionwill output
an interpretation of the conditional A >c B and an extended probability function
P′c such that Stalnaker’s equation holds for A >c B relative to P
′
c. This establishes
the tenability of the Local Thesis for simple conditionals.
Because P′ extends P, if we start with a probability function P that obeys the
Principal Principle with respect to non-conditional sentences, then P′ will also
obey the Principal Principle with respect to non-conditional sentences. So there
is no obstacle to upholding both the Principal Principle (with respect to non-
conditional sentences) and the Local Thesis.
My derivation of the Conditional Principal Principle also relied on the princi-
ple of Independence, repeated below.
Independence
Po(Ac B|E−c (A)) = Po(Ac B|Ec)
Independence can reformulated as a principle about indicative conditionals.
Let c− be a hypothetical context in which our information is characterized by
E−c (A). Onmy theory, the proposition expressed by the counterfactual, relative to
context c, is identical to the proposition expressed by the indicative conditional,
relative to context c−. So Independence becomes:
Indicative Independence
Po(A >c− B|E−c (A)) = Po(A >c− B|Ec)
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Stated as a principle about indicatives, it is easy to show that certain instances
of this principle are consistent with the Local Thesis. Indeed, we can show that
a special case of the principle is entailed by the Local Thesis, given a Stalnakerian
semantics for the conditional. LetEc = E−c (A)∩¬A, and assume thatPo(¬A|E−c (A)).
Then Independence says that the proposition expressed by the indicative condi-
tional, relative to c−, is probabilistically independent of the negation of its an-
tecedent, relative to the information in c−. And this fact is a well-known conse-
quence of the Local Thesis, assuming Stalnaker’s selection semantics for condi-
tionals.29
Of course, showing that Independence holds for this particular choice of Ec
and E−c (A) does not show much. That’s because it’s not normally the case that
Ec = E−c (A) ∩ ¬A. Suppose I know that neither you nor your partner went to the
party last night, and that you often attend parties together. When I evaluate:
(25) If you had gone to the party, your partner would have gone to the party.
I don’t hold fixed that you didn’t go, but I also don’t hold fixed that your part-
ner didn’t go. So we don’t get to my present knowledge by intersecting what I
hold fixed with the proposition that you did not go to the party—the negation of
the counterfactual’s antecedent. We get to my present knowledge by intersect-
ing what I hold fixed with the proposition that neither you nor your partner
attended the party—the conjunction of the negation of the antecedent and the
negation of the consequent.
Often our current knowledge results from intersecting what we’re holding
fixed, relative to some proposition A, with some proposition Q that is stronger
than ¬A. It would be good to show that, for any such Q, the conditional A >c− B
is probabilistically independent of Q relative to Po(·|E−c (A)). Formally, where Q
is any proposition entailing ¬A such that Po(Q|E−c (A)) > 0:
Po(A >c− B|E−c (A)) = Po(A >c− B|E−c (A) ∩ Q)
29Let Pc− = Po(·|E−c (A)). Note that Pc−(A >c− B|A) = Pc−(A >c− B) just in case Pc−(A >c−
B|¬A) = Pc−(A >c− B). So it suffices to show that Pc−(A >c− B|A) = Pc−(A >c− B).
Pc−(A >c− B|A) = Pc− (A>c−B∧A)Pc− (A)
= Pc− (A∧B)Pc− (A)
= Pc−(B|A)
= Pc−(A >c− B)
The step from the second line to the third line relies on Stalnaker’s logic for the conditional—
specifically, the principle of Strong Centering, which says that (A > B ∧ A) is true just in case
(A∧B) is true. Strong Centering follows fromMinimality given Stalnaker’s assumption that there
is always a unique selected antecedent-world.
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Stated in terms of counterfactuals, this becomes:
Po(Ac B|E−c (A)) = Po(Ac B|E−c (A) ∩ Q)
This says: The probability of the proposition expressed by the counterfactual in c,
conditional onwhat’s held fixed in c, is equal to the probability of the proposition
expressed by the counterfactual in c, conditional on the intersection of what’s
held fixed in c andQ, whereQ is any proposition that entails ¬A (and is assigned
positive probability by Po(·|E−c (A))). In the appendix, I show that this fact holds
in our simplified Stalnaker-Bernoulli models. This establishes the tenability of
many plausible instances of Independence with respect to these models.
Let’s look at a simple example. Suppose that E−c (A) = {w1,w2,w3,w4}. Sup-
pose that A is true at w1 and w2, but false at w3, and w4. And suppose that B is
true atw1 andw3, but false atw2 andw4. If we assume that each world has equal
probability, then the probability A >c− B, relative to E−c (A), is equal to the pro-
portion of sequences of OE−c (A) whose first A-world is B-world. It is easy to verify
that OE−c (A) contains 24 sequences and that 12 of these sequences are such that
their first A-world is a B-world. So the probability of the conditional A >c− B,
relative to E−c (A), is 1/2.
Now consider a ¬A-entailing factual proposition—say, ¬A ∧ ¬B. This propo-
sition is true at all and only the sequences in OE−c (A) whose first world isw4:
〈w4,w1,w2,w3〉, 〈w4,w1,w3,w2〉, 〈w4,w2,w1,w3〉
〈w4,w2,w3,w1〉, 〈w4,w3,w1,w2〉, 〈w4,w3,w2,w1〉
There are six sequences in total beginning with w4, three of which are such that
their first A-world is a B-world. So the conditional is true at half of sequences
beginning withw4, which is to say that the probability ofA >c− B, conditional on
¬A∧¬B, is again 1/2. The conditional is probabilistically independent of¬A∧¬B,
relative to E−c (A). Formally we have shown that:
Po(A >c− B|E−c (A)) = Po(A >c− B|E−c (A) ∩ (¬A ∧ ¬B))
Stated in terms of counterfactuals, this says:
Po(Ac B|E−c (A)) = Po(Ac B|E−c (A) ∩ (¬A ∧ ¬B))
The same will be true of any factual Q entailing ¬A. Zoom in on the set of se-
quences in OE−c (A) that make Q true. The proportion of sequences in this new set
whose first A-world is B-world will be equal to 1/2.
We have seen that there are Stalnaker-Bernoulli models—of the simplified
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variety that I have presented in this section—in which each of the Principal Prin-
ciple, the Local Thesis, and Independence holds. In each of these, the Local Con-
ditional Principal Principle holds, too. I leave a full tenability proof—one that dis-
penses with the simplifying assumptions I have made here—to future research.
9 Conclusion
The project of this article has been to sketch a neo-Stalnakerian, uniform theory
of conditionals that allows us to derive a plausible, contextualist-friendly ver-
sion of Skyrms’ Thesis (the Local Conditional Principal Principle) from a plausi-
ble, contextualist-friendly version of Stalnaker’s Thesis (the Local Thesis) and a
plausible chance-deference norm (the Principal Principle). I close by outlining
two questions for future research.
One question is about chance. I used the Principal Principle to derive a ver-
sion of Skyrms’ Thesis. But the Principal Principle is just one candidate chance-
deference norm—one way of formalizing the claim that one’s credences ought
to be guided by objective chances. Other candidates are Hall’s New Principle
and Dorst’s Trust Principle.30 One area of future research involves determining
whether we can derive counterfactual versions of these principles from the Local
Thesis and their non-conditional counterparts.
Another question is about semantics. I’ve given a semantics for counterfac-
tuals on which the meaning of a counterfactual is closely related to the meaning
of an indicative conditional. A full defense of this theory would require showing
how to derive this meaning compositionally. I am optimistic about the prospects
of this project if one adopts a certain approach to the role of tense in counterfac-
tuals. Letme conclude by saying something about the approach I favor. Plausibly,
a ‘would’-conditional is composed of a ‘will’-conditional under a past tense op-
erator. (For defense of this claim, see, for example, Ippolito (2013).) There are
two main hypotheses about what this past tense operator does, one of which I
take to be particularly promising: the past-as-modal view, on which the past
tense is interpreted as a modal.31 (The alternative approach is the past-as-past
view, on which the past tense has its usual temporal meaning in counterfactu-
als. See Khoo (2015) for a defense of this approach.) Inspired by Schulz (2014),
one understanding of the past-as-modal view says that the past tense shifts the
information state relative to which we interpret the embedded indicative condi-
30See Kevin Dorst (2020). Note that Dorst’s principle is formulated as a principle about def-
erence to one’s own (future) evidence, but Ben Levinstein (ms) advocates adopting Trust for
deference to chance.
31See, for example, Iatridou (2000) and Schulz (2014) for defenses of this approach.
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tional. Specifically, the past tense operator shifts the information state from the
set of worlds consistent with our actual information to the set of worlds consis-
tent with what we hold fixed. The result is that a counterfactual is true, relative to
our present context, just in case the corresponding indicative conditional is true
relative to the information we’re holding fixed when we evaluate the counterfac-
tual. This, of course, is exactly what my uniform theory of conditionals predicts:
the only difference between indicative conditionals and counterfactuals is the
information that is held fixed when we evaluate the conditional.32
32Thanks to ZachBarnett, Fabrizio Cariani,Harvey Lederman, andDaniel Rothschild for help-
ful conversations. Thanks to Kevin Dorst, Branden Fitelson, Simon Goldstein, SarahMoss, Bern-
hard Salow, Paolo Santorio, and Robbie Williams for feedback on earlier drafts. Special thanks
to David Boylan, Melissa Fusco, Arc Kocurek, Matt Mandelkern, and Milo Phillips-Brown for
extensive feedback throughout the project.
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10 Appendix
Begin with some notation and terminology.
■ Let X be any finite set of worlds.
■ Let S be the set of all sequences of worlds in X.
■ Let A >S B be the set of all sequences in Swhose first A-world is a B-world.
■ Let Sx be the set of sequences in S whose first element is x.
■ For any x ∈ X, let X−x be X − {x}. Let S−x be the set of all sequences of
worlds in X−x.
We begin by showing:
Claim 1. For any x such that x ∈ X and x /∈ A: |A>SB||S| = |A>SxB||Sx|
We will show Claim 1 by proving two sub-claims that together entail Claim 1.
Those claims are (1) and (2) below, for any x such that x ∈ X and x /∈ A:
1. |A>SB||S| =
|A>S−xB|
|S−x|
2. |A>S−xB||S−x| =
|A>SxB|
|Sx|
Proof of (1).
Let |X−x| = n. Then |S−x| = n! and |S| = (n + 1)!. We know that for any
sequence o ∈ S−x, there are exactly n + 1 sequences in S that preserve the or-
der of the elements in o. Roughly, that is because, for any o ∈ S−x, there are
n + 1 places where we can insert x: at the beginning of the sequence, after the
first element, after the second element, and so forth. For example, consider o =
〈w1,w2,w3, . . . ,wn〉. There are n+1 sequences in S that preserve the order of the
elements of o:
〈x,w1,w2,w3, ...〉
〈w1, x,w2,w3, ...〉
〈w1,w2, x,w3, ...〉
〈w1,w2,w3, x...〉
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And so forth. For each of these sequences, the first A-world in the sequence will
be a B-world just in case the first A-world in o—the original sequence—is a B-
world. So, for any o ∈ A >S−x B , there are exactly n+1 sequences in A >S B. This
means that we can reason as follows:
|A>SB|
|S| =
|A>S−xB|(n+1)
(n+1)! =
|A>S−xB|(n+1)
(n+1)(n!) =
|A>S−xB|
n! =
|A>S−xB|
|S−x|
Proof of (2).
The sequences in Sx are the same as the sequences in S−x, except that x is tacked
on to the beginning of each. Let f : < w1, . . . ,wn > 7→ < x,w1, . . . ,wn >. Then
f is a bijection from S−x to Sx as well as from A >S−x B to A >Sx B. So Claim 2
immediately follows: |A>S−xB||S−x| =
|A>SxB|
|Sx|
We have shown Claim 1. Next we want to show Claim 2 (where |SQ| is the set
of sequences in S whose first world is a Q-world and |A >SQ B| be the set of
sequences in SQ whose first A-world is a B-world):
Claim 2. Where Q is any proposition that entails ¬A: |A>SB||S| =
|A>SQB|
|SQ|
Proof of Claim 2.
Let Q = {x1, . . . , xn}. We know:
■ |SQ| = |Sx1|+ . . .+ |Sxn|
■ |A >SQ B| = |A >Sx1 B|+ . . .+ |A > SxnB|
Then we can reason as follows:
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|A>SQB|
|SQ| =
|A>Sx1B|+...+|A>SxnB|
|Sx1 |+...+|Sxn | =
|A>Sx1B|(n)
|Sx1 |(n) =
|A>Sx1B|
|Sx1 | =
|A>SB|
|S| =
The third line follows from the second because (a) |Sx1| = |Sx2| = . . . = |Sxn| and
(b) |A >Sx1 B| = |A >Sx2 B| = . . . = |A >Sxn B|. And Claim 1 secures the inference
from the fourth line to the fifth line.
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